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CORPORATE BIGNESS AND DIVERSIFICATION
IN MANUFACTURING
CHARLES H. BERRY*
The author raises questions regarding the relevance of corporate
growth in analyzing economic performance in manufacturing, and
reasons that the implications of corporate concentration depend on
changes in degree of market power associated with individual manu-
facturing industries, and not simply size structure. His vehicle of
analysis focuses on interaction among large firms, and he simul-
taneously attempts to develop tentative measures of industrial sta-
bility not heretofore given precise consideration.
There is little doubt that the largest American manufacturing
corporations have increased their relative share of domestic manufactur-
ing activity during the past fifteen years. That conclusion holds, to a
greater or lesser degree, regardless of the measure of corporate size on
which the comparison is based. The most dramatic evidence is provided
by recent tabulations of the Bureau of Census: the share of total value
added in manufacturing accounted for by the largest 200 manufacturing
corporations rose from 30 percent in 1947 to 41 percent in 1963.1 This
is an increase of more than 35 percent. Other sources show a smaller
increase, and some comparisons are provided below.
The purpose of this paper, however, is not to discuss alternative
measures of big business growth, but to raise questions regarding the
relevance of big business growth to the analysis of economic perform-
ance in manufacturing, and to suggest aspects of that growth which are
deserving of attention. Some highly tentative empirical findings are
included to illustrate the argument and indicate the nature of the work
that needs to be done.
An increasing concentration of business power, typically defined in
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terms of the degree of concentration of corporate assets, is believed by
some spokesmen to be a development against which policy instruments
should be brought to bear.2 But it happens not to be an aspect of
economic structure central either to the interpretation of existant anti-
trust statutes, or, for that matter, to the traditional analysis of economic
behavior. Both in antitrust law, and in economic analysis, "mere size"
is not at issue. In the case of the former, the statutes are worded in
terms either of monopoly or of a lessening of competiton; in economic
analysis the relevant factor is market power. These are horizontal con-
cepts. They are applicable to industries, or to inter-related industries,
but not to the size distribution of firms as such. The increase in cor-
porate concentration shown by the census tabulations are for the entire
manufacturing sector. They bear no necessary relation to change in the
relative position of firms within the individual industries comprising the
manufacturing sector.
This is not to say that the structure of individual markets has not
changed correspondingly during this period. Neither is it to say that a
case cannot be made that the size structure of manufacturing firms,
in addition to the structure of manufacturing industries, ought to be
relevant to antitrust interpretation. Bigness per se, however, has not
been relevant, or has only been peripherally relevant, to antitrust deter-
mination as it exists at the present time. If the criteria of pure size is to
be introduced, it must be through direct demonstration of an economic
effect, or through modification of the statutes under which antitrust
now proceeds.
It is interesting that the authors of the most recent economic ap-
praisal of antitrust tentatively include the limitation of big business, the
"creation of a desirable distribution of social power among business units
by changing the relative positions of 'large' and 'small' firms in the
economy . . ." as one of four aims of antitrust considered 3 It is more
interesting, however, that this goal is rejected:
We would discard the general limiting of big business power as an
independent goal of antitrust policy. Some change in the size distribu-
tion of firms will be a by-product of the limitation of market power.
To the extent that general business power rests on market power,
the limitations of one will correspondingly limit the other. Any anti-
trust policy, if vigorously prosecuted, that goes beyond the regula-
tion of conduct represents (or reflects) some limitation on the
general social and political power of big business. An attempt to
press the restraint of big business beyond these results... would
2 Hearings on S. Res. 40 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 817-30 (1965).
3 C. Kaysen & D. Turner, Antitrust Policy 17 (1959).
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be so costly in terms o1 other goals that we rule it out as a desirable
policy. (Italics added.) 4
The argument leading to this conclusion is that an arbitrary and effec-
tive limit on firm size, without regard for the structure, conduct, and
performance of individual markets, could run counter to the goals of
efficiency and competition within those markets. In the absence of con-
siderations relating to market power, proscribing actions of firms purely
on the basis of size could lead in the direction of poorer economic per-
formance within the market(s) involved.5
The argument is frequently made that the desirability of an im-
proved (i.e., more equal) distribution of business power more than
outweighs any disadvantage in terms of economic performance in
particular markets. 6 Proponents of the "new" competition argue the
opposite.7 The point remains, however, that the behavior of firms within
markets is related to market power, which is an ability to behave
persistently in a significantly non-competive fashion, and not to firm
size as such.8 If the argument is to be made that large firm size neces-
sarily implies market power, not only is that argument yet to be estab-
lished, but the bare bones of the argument remain to be discovered. To
be sure, a sizable part of the economic literature of antitrust focuses,
frequently incorrectly, on the concept of leverage.0 But even granting
leverage, it is not that firm size conveys market power, but that market
4 Id. at 49.
5 For an interesting and related discussion of policy goals, see J. Bain, Industrial
Organization 458-76 (1959).
6 It has also been made in antitrust proceedings. Justice Douglas, for example, has
argued:
Industrial power should be decentralized. It should be scattered into many hands
so that the fortunes of the people will not be dependent on the whim or caprice,
the political prejudices, the emotional stability of a few self-appointed men ....
That is the philosophy and the command of the Sherman Act. It is founded on
a theory of hostility to the concentration in private hands of power so great that
only a government of the people should have it.
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495, 536 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
7 See A. Kaplan, Big Enterprise in a Competitive System (1964); D. Lilienthal, Big
Business, A New Era (1953); and, of course, the classic, J. Schumpeter, Capitalism,
Socialism, and Democracy (1942). For a general survey, now somewhat dated, see E.
Mason, Economic Concentration and the Monopoly Problem 371-81 (1957).
8 The definition of market power employed throughout this paper is from C. Kaysen
& D. Turner, supra note 3, at 75.
9 For a good illustration of the limitations of the leverage argument, see Bork,
"Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an Economic Mis-
conception," 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 157 (1954). See also M. Adelman, A & P: A Study in
Price-Cost Behavior and Public Policy, 360 (1959) and Burstein, "The Economics of
Tie-in Sales," 42 Rev. Econ. Stat. 68 (1960).
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power is transferable among related markets. Firm size is not a measure
of market position or power within particular markets. The leverage of
size alone is, if anything, the leverage of public familarity or ac-
ceptance. That kind of leverage is difficult to distinguish from revealed
public preference.
I. MARKET POWER AND BIG BUSINEss GROWTH
Be this as it may, there is still the question of what has happened to
market power as big business has increased its relative share of manu-
facturing activity. Although corporate size is not a direct proxy for
market power, the increased share of value added in manufacturing
accounted for by the largest manufacturing firms in 1963 in comparison
with 15 years earlier is sufficient to suggest that the structures of the
manufacturing markets themselves may have undergone substantial
change as a result of this increase. The direction of that change is
uncertain. The problem is one of establishing the source of increased
corporate concentration, and there are several possibilities.
A. Increased Market Shares
Increasing concentration at the level of the manufacturing firm
could, on the one hand, simply reflect more rapid than average expan-
sion by large firms within their respective industries. If this were so,
relative growth by large firms would imply a corresponding increase in
the relative shares of those firms within the industries or markets where
they have previously been active. This might occur only in those in-
dustries where the large firms have been small sellers, but generally
growth of large firms through expansion of their existing market posi-
tions would suggest, if anything, an increased concentration of the
individual manufacturing industries, and hence a development in an
undesirable direction even for those who view antitrust in this "nar-
row" or behavioral context.'0 This is a frequent interpretation of big
business growth.
B. Industry Growth
Alternatively, however, large manufacturing firms could show
relative growth as firms without any increase in the concentration of
10 This assumes that large firms tend also to be among the largest sellers within their
respective industries. This is not entirely correct because the large firms are sufficiently
diversified to make industrial affiliations difficult to summarize, but it is certainly true
for a large number. See Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly, Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, Concentration Ratios in Manufacturing Industry, 1958, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 2, Table 29, at 478-9 (1962). In 54 percent of 1,014 5-digit product classes in manu-
facturing, at least one of the 4 largest producers is shown as one of the 100 largest
manufacturing companies.
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individual manufacturing industries, or with precisely the opposite ef-
fect. In the simplest case, large manufacturing firms could grow relative
to total manufacturing with no change in market structure if the
activities of large firms were distributed proportionately more heavily
among the rapidly growing industries. Furthermore, the relative size of
the largest firms could increase for this reason even with some decline in
their respective market positions. The relative rates of growth of those
industries including the large firms could be sufficient to over-com-
pensate for a declining market share of the large firms within those in-
dustries.
The market power implications of increasing firm size derived from
this source would depend largely on the changing characteristics of the
"rapidly" and the "less rapidly" growing industries. For example, if
the rapidly growing industries were also the more concentrated, the
"average" industry would be more highly concentrated. Insofar as
industry concentration serves as an indicator of potential market power,
those industries where market power may be present would have become
a relatively larger part of the sector as a whole. This could, however,
carry with it some decline in the concentration of individual markets or
industries. The important point is that differential rates of industry
growth within manufacturing can affect the size distribution of manu-
facturing firms quite independently of change in the concentration of
the manufacturing industries.
C. Industrial Diversification
Relative growth by the largest manufacturing firms could also stem
from increased diversification or from the abandonment of some prod-
ucts and the addition of others. In either case, entry would be involved.
If relative growth of big firms has largely stemmed from new entry,
either accompanied or unaccompanied by exit, at least one feature
of that growth has been the introduction of new, or different, com-
petitors in the industries or markets invaded. More generally, the
argument might be made that the appearance of increasingly con-
glomerate firms would be consistent with a decline in the significance
of barriers to entry, a comparative advantage of the large firm as an
entrant, and the development of the conglomerate firm as an institu-
tion compensating for past imperfections in the capital market. In this
sense, the firm which grows not by expansion within its industry(ies),
and not merely by keeping pace with its industry (ies), but by respond-
ing to the market incentives for entry and exit among industries demon-
strates, not the exercise of market power, but aggressive, competitive
behavior. Changing product or industrial diversification is one index
of that behavior.
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Diversification, however, can readily be more apparent than real.
In the most obvious case, diversification can occur merely through
merger, without new entry. In addition, the 4-digit industries of manu-
facturing are not equally independent of one another; 1 interdepen-
dence, both horizontal and vertical, is present. Entry or diversifica-
tion need not be purely "conglomerate." From simple tabulations of
"new 4-digit industries entered," no conclusions with respect to the
impact on entry barriers can be drawn.
Suppose, for example, that "diversification" is primarily verti-
cal; although in terms of sales the large firms control no more of their
original markets, entry and expansion has extended that control for-
ward or backward from those original markets. Without raising any
question of the resulting change in monopoly power, entry barriers
would, if anything, have been increased. 12 As the importance of inde-
pendent markets for intermediate goods decreases, effective entry is
more likely to require the form of a vertically integrated operation
with correspondingly higher capital requirements. Insofar as barriers
to entry arise from imperfect capital markets, vertical integration can
be expected to make entry more difficult.
11 The products of manufacturing are classified by the Bureau of the Census
according to the Standard Industrial Classification prepared by the Office of Statistical
Standards. The Bureau of the Census describes the SIC as follows:
The system operates in such a manner that the definitions become progressively
narrower with the successive addition of numerical digits. Thus at one extreme
are the 20 very broad 2-digit major industry groups and at the other 7,500
individual 7-digit products. In between are approximately 430 4-digit industries
and 4-digit product groups and about 1,000 5-digit product classes. An example
of the increasing particularity achieved with the addition of digits is provided
by the meat products field, which is part of the 2-digit major industry group,
"Food and Kindred Products":
Standard Industrial
Classification Code Designation Name
20 Major industry group Food and Kindred Products
201 Industry group Meat Products
2011 Industry Meat packing (slaughtering)
plants
20111 Product Class Fresh beef
20111-12 Product Whole carcass beef
See Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
Concentration Ratios in Manufacturing Industry, 1963, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 1, xii (1966). For a complete listing of the SIC, see U. S. Bureau of the
Budget, Standard Industrial Classification Manual (1957).
12 Monopoly power is a horizontal concept, unaffected by vertical integration. See
Bork, supra note 9.
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The same argument can also be made with respect to entry to or
diversification among horizontally related industries. If diversification
has achieved significant representation in related industries for large
firms, successful entry by outside independents is likely to be more
difficult, increasing the likelihood that market power in particular in-
dustries can be exercised with a greater degree of impunity.
D. Market Power and Entry Barriers
The emphasis here on barriers to entry is intended. No attack on
market power will be so pervasive as one tending to alleviate the signi-
ficance of barriers to entry. Alternatively, no development is apt to be
more conducive to the exercise of market power than structural change
tending to increase the significance of barriers to entry among the
industries of manufacturing.3
To the extent that big business growth reflects increasing size
within particular markets, or a growing relative importance of the
industries characterized by bigness, no evidence can be generated from
this source that entry barriers have been lessened. The opposite would
be more likely. Similarly, to the extent that big business growth stems
from entry into industries closely related, the resulting diversification
is only apparent; such an appearance is a product of an industrial
classification system, and not true diversification.
But if the relative growth of big firms in the past fifteen years
reflects widespread new entry, if the "new" big business is increasingly
conglomerate, and if that conglomerateness is characterized by an in-
creased instability in the industry affiliation of these large firms, that
evidence would not be consistent with the argument that this growth in
bigness has tended to rigidify structure. It would suggest rather that
the effect may well have been to reduce the significance of barriers
to entry and to limit the potential of such market power as does exist
within the manufacturing sector.
II. CORPORATE CONCENTRATION AND DIVERSIFICATION
What follows are some preliminary results from an examination
of two aspects of recent large scale corporate growth in manufacturing.
The analysis is confined in the first instance to an assessment of the
longer range implications of changes in the relative positions of the
largest manufacturing firms between 1948 and 1962-64. This is fol-
lowed by some findings about entry, exit, and changing diversification
by the largest industrial corporations during the last five years. In each
13 See J. Bain, Barriers to New Competition 182-204 (1956); Turner, "Conglomerate
Mergers and Section 7 of The Clayton Act," 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1313, 1321-22 (1965).
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case, the emphasis is on the interaction among the largest corporations
active in manufacturing. The central question throughout relates to
the kind of inter-corporate shifts which have developed with large
scale corporate growth, not simply a measurement of that growth. By
any standard, that growth has been appreciable. But there are differ-
ences in the structure of growth shown by different sources.
A. Changing Corporate Concentration
The census data on value added in manufacture reported at the
outset of this paper show an increase of roughly 38 percent in the rela-
tive size of the 200 largest manufacturing firms between 1947 and 1963.
Most of that growth is attributed to the 50 largest manufacturing firms.
These census tabulations are reproduced in Table I. The share of the
TABLE I
SHARE OF TOTAL VALUE ADDED BY MANUFACTURE ACCOUNTED FOR
BY THE LARGEST MANUFACTURING COMPANIES,
1947, 1954, 1958 AND 196314
Percent of Total Value Added in Manufacture*
Company Group 1947 1954 1958 1963
Largest 50 17 23 23 25
Largest 100 23 30 30 33
Largest 150 27 34 35 37
Largest 200 30 37 38 41
* Value added in manufacture is the value of shipments less the cost of materials
purchased. It can be approximated by net income before tax plus payroll.
TABLE II
TOTAL ASSETS OF THE 500 LARGEST MANUFACTURING COMPANIES AS
PERCENT OF TOTAL ASSETS OF MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS,
1948, 1954, 1958, 1962 AND 196415
Percent of Total Manufacturing Assets
Company Group 1948 1954 1958 1962 1964
Largest 50 34.7 36.6 37.8 38.2 37.3
Largest 100 43.7 46.3 48.3 48.7 47.6
Largest 200 51.5 54.5 57.2 58.0 57.2
Largest 500 58.4 62.1 66.1 68.0 67.2
14 Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
Concentration Ratios in Manufacturing Industry, 1963, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, Table
1A at 2 (1966).
15 Totals for large companies are from Standard Statistics Company, Compustat
Industrial Tape; manufacturing totals from FTC-SEC, Quarterly Financial Reports,
for years shown. The Compustat tape excludes firms from the earlier years which no
longer existed as independent firms in 1948. See note 17 infra.
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50 largest companies increased by almost one-half, from 17 percent
in 1947 to 25 percent in 1963. In contrast the share of the next largest
150 companies increased by only three percentage points, from 13 to
16 percent.
The pattern is different if the definition of corporate growth is
based on more generally available measures of corporate size.'" Table
II shows growth rates of the largest manufacturing corporations which
result when assets are employed as a measure of corporate size.17 The
observed rate of growth by large companies is reduced. For the 200
largest the increase is from 51.5 percent of all corporate assets in
manufacturing in 1948 to 58.0 percent in 1962. This is an increase of
only 13 percent in contrast with the Census Bureau's 38 percent, and
a decline is shown between 1962 and 1964. In addition, the growth in
Table II is more evenly distributed among the large corporations. The
largest 50 firms appear to have grown less, not more, than the following
150 largest.
There is little reason, however, for the two comparisons to even
closely parallel one another. The Compustat data of Table II are less
complete than the census tabulations. Furthermore, value added and
total assets are not equivalent concepts. It is not surprising that there
are differences between Tables I and II. Neither is it surprising that
the level of corporate concentration is higher in Table II. The largest
firms are the more capital-intensive manufacturing firms. On the other
16 There are well-known technical, if not conceptual, problems both in estimating
firm size and, given corporate interlocks, in defining an independent firm. Cf. Hearings
on S. Res. 262 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 8-19, 231-83 (1964). See also Adelman,
"The Measurement of Industrial Concentration," 33 Rev. Econ. Stat. 269 (1951).
17 Except for the manufacturing totals, Table II is based on the Standard Statistics
Company's Compustat Industrial Tape, which, at this processing, contained data
for 900 industrial corporations. These were all corporations whose securities were included
in 1965 in either the Dow Jones industrial index or the Standard and Poor's industrial
index, plus, in general, the larger companies with stocks listed on the major exchanges.
However, companies which would have qualified for inclusion in an earlier year but
which did not exist as independent corporations in 1965 were excluded. The percentages
shown in Table II have, therefore, a bias towards growth. For example, companies
which disappeared by merger or liquidation are not included in the 1948 totals. This bias
further emphasizes the disparity between the census value added data and those available
from public sources. Totals for all manufacturing, against which the percentages of
Table II were calculated, are from the FTC-SEC Quarterly Financial Reports. The FTC-
SEC totals exclude assets of newspaper publishers, and of noncorporate manufacturers.
Total assets of newspaper publishers account for less than 3.5 percent of total manufactur-
ing assets. Unincorporated manufacturers account for about 5 percent of total manu-
facturing assets. See Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly, Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, Economic Concentration, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 348 (1964).
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hand, it is not obvious that the growth patterns which emerge should be
as different as they are. Under census disclosure rules, it is not possi-
ble to reconcile the two. The data of Table I are not available on an
individual corporate basis. Any further analysis must necessarily be
based on the publicly available asset or income records of manufactur-
ing corporations. Value added cannot generally be obtained from pub-
lished corporate accounts. Table II illustrates the structure of the
data on which the remainder of this section is based.
Table III provides both greater detail and some projections. The
514 largest Compustat manufacturing companies, defined to include any
TABLE III
DISTRIBUTION OF 514 MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS, BY ASSET SIZE
CLASS BASED ON THE TOTAL ASSETS OF THE 500 LARGEST
MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS, 1948, 1962, AND
PROJECTED STEADY-STATE18
Number and Percent of CorporationsAsset Size Class: ____________________
Percent of Total 1948 1962 Steady-State
Assets of 500 Largest Number Percent Number Percent Percent
Over .781 28 5.45 16 3.11 .25
.391 to .781 31 6.03 36 7.00 2.31
.195 to .391 49 9.53 47 9.14 5.72
.098 to .195 80 15.56 80 15.56 15.36
.049 to .098 104 20.23 113 21.98 25.21
.024 to .049 110 21.40 123 23.93 29.14
Less Than .024 112 21.79 99 19.26 22.01
TOTAL 514* 100.00 514 100.00 100.00
* This total would be significantly larger if firms disappearing from the 500 largest
by merger were included. The steady-state distribution, however, would be unaffected.
See note 17 supra.
surviving company among the 500 largest in 1948 or in 1962, are ar-
rayed by asset size class in 1948 and in 1962. The size classes employed
for this purpose are based on the total assets of the 500 largest firms
in each year. For example, the 28 firms classified in the first upper left
hand cell of Table III each had assets totalling more than .781 percent
of the total assets of the 500 largest Compustat manufacturing com-
panies in 1948. Except for the open-ended bottom and top classes, the
upper limit of each class is double its lower limit. The interval 1948 to
1962 is selected because the large firms showed greater relative growth
during this period than between 1948 and 1964.
The actual transition of the 514 firms among these size classes
is shown by Table IV. Were this pattern of transition to continue, the
18 Standard Statistics Company, Compustat Industrial Tape.
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distribution of the largest 500 firms would ultimately take the form of
the steady-state distribution shown in Table III. This is the distribution
of firms which would be attained and maintained if the movement of the
individual firms among relative size classes exhibited during the 1948-
1962 interval were to continue indefinitely.19 The underlying Markov
technique provides a method for projecting a pattern of firm growth,
such as that displayed by Table IV, to its ultimate implication in terms
of the size distribution of firms. It is a device for summarizing this
aspect of corporate turnover.
Tables III and IV describe, however, the distribution of only the
largest firms. They say nothing about the implied growth of this group
of large firms relative to the total sector. Within that group, the pro-
jected steady-state of Table III suggests that should large corporations
continue growing as they did between 1948 and 1962 the largest among
them would ultimately tend to lose ground to the smaller firms in the
group. Indeed, in the second largest size class, an observed increase in
the number of firms within that class between 1948 and 1962 is con-
sistent with a longer range decline in that same category."0
A similar pattern is displayed when the analysis is repeated for
shorter intervals within the 1948-1962 period. Table V contains the
steady-state distributions projected when estimates of inter-size class
19 The derivation of this steady-state distribution entails the application of a
Markov probabilistic method to the observed movement of firms among size classes
during the time period considered. For a good discussion of the technique see Adelman,
"A Stochastic Analysis of the Size Distribution of Firms," 53 Am. Stat. Ass'n J. 893
(1958). See also Collins & Preston, "The Size Structure of the Largest Industrial Firms,
1909-1958," 51 Am. Econ. Rev. 986, 992-96 (1961).
20 Steady-state solutions will be influenced by the way in which size classes are
defined. They are here defined so that to move from one size class to another a firm
must double its asset size relative to the average size of the 500 largest firms. This classi-
fication is arbitrary, but has the desirable feature of distributing large firms relatively
evenly among size classes, and of imposing a consistent standard of relative growth for
mobility among classes regardless of initial firm size. The top and bottom size classes
have been collapsed to avoid the distortion at either extreme that would be introduced
by inferring a probability of interclass mobility on the basis of the experience of very
few firms. This is also the reason for desiring the relatively even distribution of firms
among the size classes that was noted above. Different procedures in this regard could
produce different solutions.
Two other consequences of collapsing largest size classes should be noted. First, firms
which may differ significantly in size are treated as homogeneous, and there is the danger
of inferring the possible exit from this size class of the very largest firms on the basis
of the observed exit of some of the smaller firms included within the same collapsed size
class. Secondly, as the size of the firms in the open-ended size class is unbounded, there is
the possibility that the steady-state distribution may contain a very small proportion of
the total number of firms in the largest class, but these firms may account for an increased
share of the total assets of all firms. These are necessary shortcomings of the technique.
[Vol. 28
1967] CORPORATE BIGNESS
TABLE IV
DISTRIBUTION OF THE 514 LARGEST FIRMS BY PERCENT OF TOTAL ASSETS
OF THE 500 LARGEST MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS, 1948 AND 196221
Size Class, 1948
Less
Size Class,* Over .391- .195- .098- .049- .024- Than
1962 .781 .781 .391 .195 .098 .049 .024 Total
(Number of Firms)
Over .781 15 0 1 0 0 0 0 16
.391 to .781 12 19 3 1 1 0 0 36
.195 to .391 1 12 25 6 2 1 0 47
.098 to .195 0 0 18 36 15 8 3 80
.049 to .098 0 0 2 34 41 21 15 113
.024 to .049 0 0 0 3 40 46 34 123
Less Than .024 0 0 0 0 5 34 60 99
TOTAL 28 31 49 80 104 110 112 514
* Size classes are defined in terms of the total assets of the 500 largest manufacturing
corporations. For example, the fifteen firms in the largest size class in both years each
had the assets totalling more than .781 percent of the total assets of the 500 largest
manufacturing corporations in both years.
TABLE V
PROJECTED STEADY-STATE DISTRIBUTIONS, BY PERCENT OF TOTAL
ASSETS OF THE 500 LARGEST MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS,
1948-1954; 1954-1958; 1958-1962, AND 1948-196422
Steady-State Distribution of Large Firms, as
Percent of Total Number of Firms, Based on
Asset Size Class: Inter-Class Mobility of Firms During:
Percent of Total
Assets of 500 Largest 1948-1954 1954-1958 1958-1962 1948-1964
(Percent of Firms)
Over .781 .40 1.07 0 .36
.391 to .781 2.67 3.16 0 2.60
.195 to .391 3.81 5.53 23.00 7.63
.098 to .195 10.35 21.30 24.85 18.78
.049 to .098 22.89 23.15 29.41 25.77
.024 to .049 36.97 28.14 18.75 26.16
Less Than .024 22.90 17.66 3.99 18.69
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
mobility of firms are based on the periods 1948-1954, 1954-1958, and
1958-1962. The steady-state solution implied by the relative growth
of firms between 1948 and 1964 is also included. In each of the periods
shown, relative growth by the smaller large firms is projected.
21 Standard Statistics Company, Compustat Industrial Tape.
22 Id.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
This conclusion is supported by the growth rates of the total assets
of these same firms in Table VI. Although the largest firms show growth
rates averaging more than the medium sized giants, in every period
their growth rates are less than those of the smallest corporations
among the 500 largest. If the top 25 companies had been grouped to-
gether, rather than the top 10, this effect would be even more pro-
nounced.
TABLE VI
GROWTH RATES OF THE TOTAL ASSETS OF THE 500 LARGEST
MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS, SELECTED YEARS, 1948-196423
Average Growth Rate*
1948- 1954- 1958- 1948- 1948-
Manufacturing Companies 1954 1958 1962 1962 1964
10 Largest .670 .385 .276 1.852 2.115
11 - 25 Largest .463 .326 .216 1.198 1.489
26 - 50 Largest .603 .334 .222 1.477 1.846
51 - 100 Largest .618 .395 .242 1.928 2.383
101 - 200 Largest .622 .409 .305 1.926 2.307
201 - 500 Largest .794 .477 .388 2.749 3.383
* The growth rate is defined as the increase in total assets divided by total assets
in the initial year. In each time interval, the growth rate shown is based on the perform-
ance of the corporations falling in the indicated size class in the initial year of the
comparison. These growth rates are based on the performance of firms present in both
years, classified by size in the initial year.
This relative movement of firms within the group of 500 tends to
reinforce the likelihood that growth by these corporations has been
accompanied by substantial change in the position of these firms with-
in their individual industries. At least according to this source, the
smaller of the largest manufacturing corporations have contributed a
major component of the total relative growth by the group as a whole.
Within the largest corporations, there is evidence of a leveling-out of
corporate size in terms of assets. The impact of this change on the
structure of the individual manufacturing industries is not clear.
B. Shifts in Market Structure
The remainder of this article concerns one aspect of that market
structure. The approach will be to report some preliminary indications
of the degree of stability large manufacturing corporations have shown
in terms of the 2, 3 and 4-digit industries in which their manufacturing
plants have been active." Largely ignored is the question of changes
23 Id.
24 See note 11 supra.
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in 4-digit concentration ratios. This does not mean that significant
change in the concentration of the individual manufacturing industries
has not occurred. The analysis of that change, however, is a task unto
itself, and is not attempted here.2 What follows is an assessment of the
inter-industry, rather than the intra-industry, activities of large manu-
facturing firms. The analysis is partial; the results should be inter-
preted with this in mind.
There are also data problems in this kind of investigation. Ideally,
census establishment records, aggregated by companies over a period of
time, could be used to obtain a comprehensive picture contrasting the
behavior of large manufacturing firms with firms of other sizes, not only
with respect to growth and diversification but also in terms of relative
position within the individual industries of manufacturing. The data
exist to permit this kind of analysis; census disclosure rules prevent
their availability to non-census analysts.
As the next best alternative, data from the Fortune Plant and
Product Directory for 1961 and 1966 were employed. Each Directory
contains, respectively, the 5-digit products of each plant of the 500
largest industrial corporations in 1960, and the 5-digit products of each
plant of the 1,000 largest industrial corporations in 1965.26 In these
data, individual plants are identified in each year by address and owner-
ship. To provide a record of the 5-digit products produced by each
plant in both 1960 and 1965, individual plant records in each year were
matched by address.
All told, plant records were assembled for 10,050 plants owned
by 494 companies in 1960, and 16,157 plants owned by 995 companies
in 1965.27 Of the 494 largest corporations in 1960, 461 existed in 1965.
25 The most recent measures of 4-digit concentration in manufacturing-those based
on the 1963 Census of Manufactures-became available August 1966. No major analysis
of those data has yet appeared. Superficially, between 1947 and 1963, concentration at
the 4-digit level rose in 96 industries, fell in 91 industries, and remained unchanged in 10.
The comparison is restricted by a lack of comparability among industries because of
changes in the Standard Industrial Classification. A more complete comparison is avail-
able between 1958 and 1963, where 127 4-digit industries show increases in concentration,
83 show declines, and 30 show no change. Eighty of those showing increases had 1958
concentration ratios of less than 40 percent. Where 1958 concentration was 40 percent or
more, 47 industries showed increases, 48 showed decreases, and eleven remained unchanged.
The picture is mixed. See Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly, Senate Comm. on the
judiciary, Concentration Ratios in Manufacturing Industry, 1963, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 1, Table 2, at 6-37 (1966).
26 An industrial corporation is defined by Fortune as a corporation classified either
in mining or in manufacturing. The vast majority of the 500 largest industrial corporations
are manufacturing corporations. 64 Fortune, July, 1961, at 167-86.
27 These are the companies included in Fortune's List of the 500 largest industrials
in 1961, and the 1,000 largest in 1966, excluding those companies which had no manu-
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Thirty companies disappeared by merger; two ceased manufacturing
activity, and one was liquidated. The remaining 461 had 11,590 plants
in 1965. These companies are referred to as the successor companies
to the 494 largest in 1960. The analysis reported below is largely con-
fined to the plant and product behavior of these 494 largest industrial
corporations in 1960, and their 461 successor corporations in 1965.28
Of 10,050 plants belonging to the 494 largest industrial corpora-
tions in 1960, 7,750 were also present in the data for 1965. The number
of 1961 plants not present in 1965-or, if the matching of plant records
was entirely accurate, the number of plants disappearing between 1960
and 1965-was 2,611. Correspondingly, 4,151 plants appeared for the
first time in 1965.
Of the 7,750 plants identified in both years, 7,439 were operated
by the same companies in each year, and 311 changed ownership. The
311 "sales" were chiefly, though not entirely, the result of mergers. In
the case of a merger, only the plants of the smaller of two merging
companies were included in the sold category."
1. Plant Turnover
This turnover of plant facilities is surprisingly high. The mortal-
ity of 1960 plants was about 25 percent over the five-year period, and
the birth rate over 40 percent 0 These numbers are high, and the ac-
curacy of the matching of these plants cannot be guaranteed. This point
is further developed below. Casual examination of the plant data sug-
gests, however, that much of the turnover is the result of growth in
some geographic areas and decline in others. Both disappearing plants
and new 1965 plants seem to be highly concentrated by region, although
the regions are of course different. 1
facturing facilities in the continental United States. See Fortune Plant and Product Direc-
tory, for the years 1961 and 1966, which has been selectively reduced to magnetic tapes
for this study.
28 In the case of a merger, the new corporation formed was considered to be the
.successor to the larger, in terms of assets, of the two combining corporations.
29 Fifty plants owned by the 494 companies in 1960 were reported owned by com-
panies among the 995 largest in 1965 other than the 461 successor companies. These plants
were evidently outright sales of plant facilities to independent firms.
30 Note that even if all plant "deaths" were the result of errors of omission in the
matching of plant addresses, the net birth rate of plants would still be over 15
percent. And all plant deaths were not errors. Plant records in 1960 and 1965 were com-
pared within counties. Matching was difficult in some counties, such as Los Angeles, but
in the vast majority the number of plants was small, and the death of a plant, when it
occurred, was definitive. The plant was there in 1960; no possible matching plant was
present in the county in 1965.
31 At a later stage in this work an estimate will be made of the proportion of plant
turnover which can be explained by regional factors.
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With respect to mergers, the number of plants that could be iden-
tified as having changed owners as a consequence of merger is low in
comparison with the overall turnover of plants. This finding is con-
sistent with other recent work on the quantitative impact of mergers
on corporate growth.32 Some further work presently in the planning
stage will attempt to tabulate more accurately the fate of the 1960
plants owned by companies disappearing from the 494 largest as a
result of mergers. There will still remain the difficulty that the avail-
able plant data permit no analysis of the origin of new 1965 plants. To
what degree these new plants reflect the acquisition or partial acqui-
sition of corporations outside the 494 largest, rather than the construc-
tion of totally new plants, is unknown.
2. Diversification at the Plant Level
The data are more specific regarding plant diversification. In 1960,
of 10,050 plants, 5,182 (52 percent) reported only one 4-digit product;
2,300 (23 percent) reported two; and 1,183 (12 percent) reported three
4-digit products. The distribution of the 16,157 plants operated by the
995 largest companies in 1965 was similar: 8,685 (54 percent) with one
4-digit product; 3,674 (23 percent) with two; and 1,641 (10 percent)
with three 4-digit products. The maximum number of 4-digit products
produced by a single plant was 21 in 1960 (two plants reporting this
total) and 29 in 1965 (again, two plants). This widespread presence of
single-product plants within diversified corporations is consistent with
the interpretation that economies of scale in production are important
for the products in question. An examination of the degree of plant
specialization for particular products might, therefore, be useful in
testing for scale economies with respect to those products, and similarly
the appearance of particular pairs of products or groups of products
would provide evidence of either joint economies or of a high elasticity
of substitution in production, suggesting in turn a basis for aggregating
4-digit product classes for purposes of economic analysis. The only
conclusion here is that the plants of these large industrial corporations
are highly specialized.
3. Plant Product Stability
Table VII arrays these plants of the 494 largest companies in
1960, and of their 461 successor companies in 1965, by a two-digit
classification of the products of those plants in each year. A plant is
32 See, for example, McGowan, The Effect of Alternative Anti-merger Policies on
the Size Distribution of Firms, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University (1965).
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TABLE VII
MANUFACTURING PLANTS OF THE LARGEST 494 INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATIONS, BY 2-DIGIT INDUSTRY GROUPS, 1960 AND 196533
Plants Present 1960
Plants Present, 1960 AND OR 1965, with
1965, with Products in Products in this
Industry Group this Industry Group Industry Group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1960
SIC and 1960 1965
Name Code 1965 Only Only 1960 1965
Ordnance (19) 50 17 16 38 49
Food & Kindred (20) 1483 133 15 641 581
Tobacco (21) 22 0 0 2 4
Textile Mill (22) 321 52 15 72 96
Apparel, Etc. (23) 70 5 28 17 60
Lumber & Wood (24) 164 7 22 100 125
Furniture, Etc. (25) 42 5 8 20 43
Paper & Allied (26) 655 72 30 162 323
Printing, Etc. (27) 83 7 5 43 81
Chemical, Etc. (28) 1156 85 63 469 839
Petroleum Refining (29) 224 25 14 60 141
Rubber Products (30) 189 33 62 64 208
Leather Products (31) 120 16 4 37 19
Stone, Clay, Etc. (32) 508 25 34 207 175
Primary Metals (33) 508 34 27 132 201
Fabricated Metals (34) 577 44 76 210 317
Machinery (35) 556 60 83 249 399
Electrical Mach. (36) 499 45 69 251 441
Transportation (37) 375 40 64 141 214
Scientific (38) 120 33 32 63 139
Misc. Manufacturing (39) 57 13 10 34 47
counted once in each two-digit industry in which it was represented
by one or more products. Plants which were present in the data in both
years are tabulated separately from those plants which appeared in
only one or other of the two years considered.
The first three columns relate to plants present in both years. The
first three entries of the first row of the table indicate, respectively, that
33 Fortune Plant and Product Directory, for the years 1961 and 1966. For definitions,
see U.S. Bureau of the Budget, Standard Industrial Classification Manual (Washington,
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), and 1963 Supplement. See also U.S. Bureau of
the Census, Numerical List of Manufactures Products, 1963 Census of Manufactures
(Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964).
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fifty of these plants had ordnance products in both 1960 and 1965, that
seventeen reported ordnance products only in 1960, and that sixteen,
producing in other 2-digit industries in 1960, added or substituted
ordnance products between 1960 and 1965.
The last two columns relate to plants present in 1960 or in 1965,
but not in both years. The fourth entry therefore indicates that 38
plants with ordnance products in 1960 were no longer present in the
Fortune data in 1965. Those plants either closed, the Fortune data are
in error, or the processing of the Fortune data failed to identify match-
ing plants in 1965. The fifth entry shows that forty-nine plants with
ordnance products in 1965 were totally new; corresponding plants
could not be found in 1960.
The last two columns of Table VII are the most susceptible to
processing error. The matching of plant records to produce the first
three columns was conservative. It is far more likely that actually
matching plant records in 1960 and 1965 were not identified. For this
reason the entry and exit shown in the fourth and fifth columns are
likely to be overstated. The net entry or exit shown by the difference
between the two columns34 must, however, have occurred.
Table VIII contains a similar tabulation of plants at the 4-digit
level. The relatively few 4-digit industries selected are illustrative, and
have not been chosen in any way other than to avoid 4-digit categories
which have particular problems.
The Tables show that the plants of the 494 largest corporations
are by no means tied to particular products even over as short a period
as five years. The reader will have to draw his own conclusions; there
is no established standard of comparison. But an hypothesis that com-
panies add and drop products chiefly by closing old plants and acquir-
ing new ones must be judged as incorrect. The most striking, and also
the most reliable, feature of these tables is the evidence in the second
and third columns that substantial entry and exit among industries
occurs without shutting down or adding separate plant facilities. This
conclusion appears even stronger in light of the earlier finding that
these plants are highly specialized in terms of products, and that no
significant change in the degree of plant specialization occurred over the
five year period. The capital represented by plant facilities is evi-
dently more mobile than the theory underlying some recent investment
34 Note that high turnover among 2-digit categories which is displayed by plants
that were identified in both years (columns (2) and (3)) suggests that these measures of
exit and entry (columns (4) and (5)) are less suspect than might otherwise be thought.
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TABLE VIII
MANUFACTURING PLANTS OF THE LARGEST 494 INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATIONS, BY SELECTED 4-DIGIT INDUSTRIES, 1960 AND 196535
Plants Present, 1960
Plants Present, 1960 AND OR 1965, with
1965, with Products in Products in this
4-digit Industry this Industry Group Industry Group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1960
SIC and 1960 1965
Name Code 1965 Only Only 1960 1965
Meat Packing (2011) 34 70 1 22 17
Malt Liquors (2082) 16 0 0 1 1
Cigarettes (2111) 11 0 0 1 1
Broad Woven Cotton (2211) 112 38 6 14 31
Men's ... suits,
coats, overcoats (2311) 16 0 4 1 6
Veneer & Plywood (2432) 33 7 4 16 39
Wood Furniture (2512) 10 1 0 1 6
Paper Mills (2621) 90 13 6 17 44
Book Publishing (2731) 5 1 0 3 7
Biological Drugs (2831) 19 5 6 5 17
Gum and Wood Chemicals (2861) 8 2 10 2 11
Oils and Grease (2992) 8 2 6 4 6
Tires and Tubes (3011) 33 2 1 3 15
Industrial Leather Belting (3121) 2 2 0 0 0
Flat Glass (3211) 20 1 1 0 4
Steel Pipes, Etc. (3317) 16 8 4 8 9
Metal Cans (3411) 126 3 4 23 43
Elevators, Etc. (3534) 3 1 3 1 2
Electrical Instruments (3611) 22 11 10 16 35
Aircraft Engines and Parts (3722) 49 10 13 16 31
Laboratory Instruments (3811) 22 12 9 25 51
models has assumed." At least part of the fixed capital of modern
manufacturing can be reallocated among industries.
It is tempting to infer from these tables something about the rela-
tive stability of the industries in question. For example, cigarettes (or
indeed the entire tobacco industry)-a known oligopoly-shows little
plant turnover. In contrast, gum and wood chemicals show entry both
by matched plants and by totally new plants. In each category, the
number of entering plants equals or exceeds the number of plants
originally present in 1960. It would be erroneous, however, to infer
35 Fortune Plant and Product Directory, for the years 1961 and 1966.
36 See Solow, Tobin, von Weizsicker & Yaari, "Neoclassical Growth with Fixed
Factor Proportions," 33 Rev. Econ. Stud. 79, 80 (1966).
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that this difference is consistent with what is generally known about the
structure of the two industries. These tables do not describe industries.
They reflect the activity of the plants of only a few large firms in these
industries. The expansion of plants in wood and gum chemicals, for
example, tells nothing about the entry of firms to this industry or
about change in the full plant structure of that industry. The evidence
in Table VIII is consistent with either the entry of new and independent
competitors, or the simple expansion and modernization of facilities
by an already dominant firm.
4. Entry and Exit at the Corporate Level
The more relevant measure in the context of market structure is
entry and exit at the corporate, not the plant, level. Tables VII and
VIII indicate that there is potential flexibility of corporate behavior
with respect to the product-mobility of plants. Technical considerations
TABLE IX
MANUFACTURING ACTIVITY OF THE 494 LARGEST INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATIONS, BY 2-DIGIT INDUSTRY GROUPS, 1960 AND 196537
Number of Largest 494 Corporations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1960 Total Total
Industry Group SIC and 1960 1965 in in
Name Code 1965 Only Only 1960 1965
Ordnance (19) 41 12 9 53 50
Food & Kindred (20) 84 8 14 92 98
Tobacco (21) 6 0 0 6 6
Textile Mill (22) 43 6 13 49 56
Apparel, Etc. (23) 15 4 13 19 28
Lumber & Wood (24) 34 11 19 45 53
Furniture, Etc. (25) 19 12 19 31 38
Paper & Allied (26) 78 11 19 89 97
Printing, Etc. (27) 34 6 10 40 44
Chemical, Etc. (28) 165 27 21 192 186
Petroleum Refining (29) 60 12 6 72 66
Rubber Products (30) 72 27 42 99 114
Leather Products (31) 15 6 2 21 17
Stone, Clay, Etc. (32) 81 10 21 91 102
Primary Metals (33) 117 16 18 133 135
Fabricated Metals (34) 145 19 34 164 179
Machinery (35) 170 25 36 195 206
Electrical Mach. (36) 127 17 28 144 155
Transportation (37) 97 14 27 ill 124
Scientific (38) 68 26 25 94 93
Misc. Manufacturing (39) 43 15 17 58 60
37 Fortune Plant and Product Directory, for the years 1961 and 1966.
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apparently allow plant facilities to be converted or replaced more fre-
quently than might have been expected. The degree to which this plant
mobility among product lines has reflected corporate mobility is not
clear. It is to this question that Tables IX and X are addressed.
Table IX shows, by 2-digit industry groups, the number of the 494
largest corporations which had products in the industry group in 1960
TABLE X
MANUFACTURING ACTIVITY OF THE 494 LARGEST INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATIONS, BY SELECTED 4-DIGIT INDUSTRIES, 1960 AND 196538
Number of Largest 494 Corporations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1960 Total Total
4-digit Industry SIC and 1960 1965 in in
Name Code 1965 Only Only 1960 1965
Meat Packing (2011) 10 2 0 12 10
Malt Liquors (2082) 3 0 0 3 3
Cigarettes (2111) 5 0 0 5 5
Broad Woven Cotton (2211) 18 1 4 19 22
Men's ... suits,
coats, overcoats (2311) 3 0 3 3 6
Veneer and Plywood (2432) 8 3 6 11 14
Wood Furniture (2512) 2 0 2 2 4
Paper Mills (2621) 30 5 7 35 37
Book Publishing (2731) 5 0 0 5 5
Biological Drugs (2831) 12 2 5 14 17
Gum and Wood Chemicals (2861) 8 1 3 9 11
Oils and Grease (2992) 11 3 4 14 15
Tires and Tubes (3011) 8 1 0 9 8
Industrial Leather Belting (3121) 1 1 0 2 1
Flat Glass (3211) 4 0 1 4 5
Steel Pipes, Etc. (3317) 14 4 3 18 17
Metal Cans (3411) 11 1 5 12 16
Elevators, Etc. (3534) 4 0 1 4 5
Electrical Instruments (3611) 18 10 15 28 33
Aircraft Engines and Parts (3722) 21 9 15 30 36
Laboratory Instruments (3811) 19 13 20 32 39
and in 1965, only in 1960, or only in 1965. The final two columns of
the table show the total number of companies with products in the
industry group in 1960 and in 1965. Table X is identical except that
the tabulation is for the selected 4-digit industries. In Tables IX and
X, a company is counted only once in any industry category in which
it was represented by more than one product.
Both tables show that the plant mobility of Tables VII and VIII is
88 Id.
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not restricted to the intra-company turnover of plant facilities. At the
2-digit level, in every industry group except tobacco, there was both
exit and entry by corporations within the group of the 494 largest in-
dustrials. In some industries, furniture and fixtures, for example, the
number of corporations entering and leaving the industry group (col-
umns (2) and (3)) almost equals the average number of large corpo-
rations present in the industry group (columns (4) or (5)). Even in
the most heavily populated industry group the total number of corpora-
tions either entering or leaving exceeds 20 percent of the total number
of large firms present. In the chemical group, the number of entrants
alone is over 10 percent.
No quantitative statement can be made about the impact of this
exit and entry in terms of output within these industry groups. For
example, counting companies is not an adequate means for judging the
full significance of this turnover in terms of sales. In addition, the 2-
digit industry groups are so broad in terms of the various products
included in each that the large companies present need not compete
in common markets.
On the other hand, this turnover is not eliminated when the analy-
sis is repeated at the 4-digit level. If anything, Table X suggests that
corporate entry and exit at the 4-digit level exceeds, in relative terms,
that at the 2-digit level.39 Furthermore, since it is more likely that the
companies included in each industry at the 4-digit level do compete in
common markets, confidence that this turnover reflects economically
meaningful entry and exit is increased.
The entry device itself, however, is unspecified. It is not clear,
even where major mergers are not involved, that minor acquisitions
are absent. Where entry results from the acquisition of a previously
independent firm already active in the industry in question, the num-
ber of competitors in that industry will not have changed. The argu-
ment that entry of this sort is beneficial would require the assumption
that the acquiring firm is likely to be more aggressive than the acquired
firm. There is no general presumption that this should be the case. But
in view of the entry and exit at the plant level, it seems likely that much
of this corporate entry and exit does not stem from acquisiton, and
that the effect is to add to the number of competitors within the en-
tered industries. Nevertheless, it is important to note that these data
39 Totals, over all 4-digit industries, are not yet available. At the 3-digit level, sum-
ruing over all industries-which counts companies once for each different 3-digit product-
there were 2,802 instances where a company remained in the industry group in both
years, 1,174 entries, and 734 exits. This compares at the 2-digit level with 1,567, 419 and
297, respectively. The entry and exit totals are relatively larger at the 3-digit level.
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in no sense reflect entry which is entirely devoid of the acquisition by
the large companies of formerly independent corporations.
5. Diversification at the Corporate Level
Table XI arrays the 494 companies in 1960, and their 461 suc-
cessor companies in 1965, by the number of products produced at the
2, 3, 4 and 5-digit levels. Increased diversification is indicated at all
levels of product aggregation. Had these corporations tended to diver-
sify in areas horizontally related to their original products, diversifica-
tion would have had to increase chiefly at the 4 or 5-digit levels. This
is not the case. The products of the largest industrial firms have been
spread not just within particular areas of manufacturing, but across
what appear to be broadly unrelated industries within manufacturing.40
TABLE XI
THE 494 LARGEST INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS BY NUMBER OF 2,3,4,
AND S-DIGIT PRODUCTS, 1960 AND 196541*
Number of Companies by Indicated Year and Product Class
Number 5-Digit 4-Digit 3-Digit 2-Digit
of
Products 1960 1965 1960 1965 1960 1965 1960 1965
1 - 5 85 65 179 134 234 183 384 310
6 - 10 113 85 146 114 158 127 97 128
11 - 15 105 77 85 81 57 92 13 22
16 - 20 73 65 43 65 29 27 - 1
21 - 25 45 44 17 26 9 18 - -
26 - 30 28 42 11 14 3 5 - -
31 - 35 11 27 4 10 1 5 - -
36 - 40 14 20 2 4 3 1 - -
41 - 45 6 10 2 5 - 2 - -
46 - 50 3 3 2 3 - 1 - -
51 - 75 6 16 3 4 - - - -
76 -
Total 494 461 494 461 494 461 494 461
* Several products in the same product class are counted as a single product in this
tabulation. The 461 corporations in 1965 are the successor companies to the 494 in 1960.
40 This finding is also of interest in the analysis of corporate research and develop-
ment. Richard Nelson, and others, have argued that the incentives for private investments
in basic research may be significantly related to diversification: "It is for this reason that
firms which support research toward the basic-science end of the spectrum are firms that
have their fingers in many pies." Those firms showing rapid increases in diversification
might be expected, therefore, also to be those firms displaying the greater R & D commit-
ment. See Nelson, "The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research," 67 J. Polit. Econ.
297, 302 (1959).
41 Fortune Plant and Product Directory, for the years 1961 and 1966.
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Part of this increased diversification may be spurious. First, thirty
companies among the 494 were absorbed by others within that group.
This merger activity would produce increased average diversification
within the remaining 461 firms. At present, a correction for this factor
is not possible. Secondly, if the 1965 Fortune survey was the more ac-
curate, by taking into account products in 1965 which were missed in
1960, the effect would also be to increase the measures of diversification
reported here for 1965. Again no correction is possible. Nevertheless,
one by-product of recent large scale corporate growth appears to have
been an increase, by whatever means, in the competitive overlap among
the largest manufacturing corporations.
III. CONCLUSION
The introduction to this paper outlined alternative sources of in-
creasing corporate concentration. Briefly, relative growth by the largest
manufacturing firms could reflect either growth by those firms within
their respective industries, or some form of shift in the composition of
the manufacturing activities of those firms. Alternatively, patterns of
differential growth by the industries of manufacturing could produce
the same effect with no necessary change in either the market structure
of the manufacturing industries or the product mix of the major manu-
facturing firms.
The argument of this paper is that the economic implications of
increasing corporate concentration depend not on the size structure of
firms, but on the resultant change in the degree of market power asso-
ciated with the individual manufacturing industries., The major em-
pirical focus has been on the interaction among large firms which has
accompanied large scale corporate growth, and on the development of
some tentative measures of the industrial or product stability of the
largest corporations active in manufacturing in recent years.
This is by no means a complete look at all aspects of increasing
corporate concentration. The impact of large scale corporate growth
on the concentration of individual manufacturing markets was neces-
sarily ignored, and no estimate of the impact of differential industry
growth within manufacturing is provided. Moreover, even with respect
to large scale corporate diversification, the data and analysis here in-
cluded will far from convince the skeptic, and far from satisfy the ques-
tions of even those whose intuition is not contradicted.
The findings reported here, however, argue that the hypothesis that
one feature of recent large scale corporate growth has been a rise in
the potential competition of large firms, and a decline in the effective-
ness of barriers to entry, is not necessarily false. The trend toward big-
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ness, especially in view of the turnover in relative firm size which has
accompanied it, may well have carried with it at least some structural
implications which are quite opposite from those generally associated
with bigness.
This certainly is not the only feature of that trend, and this paper
is at best only a preliminary look at one aspect of corporate diversifica-
tion. But this preliminary look does suggest that the inter-industry
structure of the largest manufacturing firms may be more flexible than
has previously been recognized, and that an increase in this flexibility
may have been an important by-product of recent large scale corpo-
rate growth.
